Answers to basic questions elude us. Is the main enemy in Iraq al-Qaeda or Sunni Baathists? Should our focus be on Shia militias? To what degree are foreign jihadists working with former Baathist regime members? What is the relationship between the Syrian government and the Sunni insurgents? Who is coordinating insurgent activity? Is Iran supporting the insurgency and how? Is our intelligence getting better over time-or are incorrect assumptions about the enemy we face actually making our understanding of the insurgency worse?I can't remember seeing so many questions strung together in such a small context throughout the past 4 years. And such is just the beginning:
Should our focus be on Shia militias? Which ones? Why them?
To what degree are foreign jihadists working with former Baathist regime members? Which foreign jihadists? Are there separate groups or some monolithic movement? And, btw, how many former Baathist members are active here? An interview some years ago with one of the leaders of this group suggest about 30-40,000 active and another 300,000 or so "reservist" members. If true, we're outnumbered.
Is Iran supporting the insurgency? Lord, there's that word "insurgency". In-'surge'-ncy. We surge, they surge, everybody surge now. Wang Chung Iraq. Sunni insurgents? Shia insurgents? al-Sadarist Shia insurgents? al-Sadarist Shia insurgents with acne?
The evolving specificity and complexity of the questions--four years into this cluster-cluck--suggests no one in the administration had a clue to Ashby's law of Requisite Variety when going forth boldly and blindly into into Iraq.
Knee deep in big-muddy and Iraq is our tar-babby.
OBL got just what he wanted.
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